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ABSTRACT 
 
The majority of current web authentication is built on username/password. Unfortunately, password 
replacement offers more security, but it is difficult to use and expensive to deploy. In this paper, we propose 
a new mutual authentication scheme called StrongAuth which preserves most password authentication 
advantages and simultaneously improves security using cryptographic primitives. Our scheme not only 
offers webmasters a clear framework which to build secure user authentication, but it also provides almost 
the same conventional user experience. Security analysis shows that the proposed scheme fulfills the 
required user authentication security benefits, and can resist various possible attacks. 
 
KEYWORDS 
 
User authentication, web security, password replacement, cryptography primitives, authentication scheme 
 
1. INTRODUCTION AND NOTATIONS 
 
On the web, user authentication is the mechanism used to validate user’s login information. 
Although authentication lies in the heart of a web application’s security, the majority of 
authentication on the web is built on username/password [1]–[3]. In fact several factors are 
behind this domination, user experience, simplicity and performance [4].  
 
At first, personal websites employed the built-in basic HTTP authentication specification for 
password submission. a HTTP server then challenges the user to supply credentials (username 
and password) in the browser built-in dialog box. If the server validates the login information, the 
user will be allowed to access the protected resources. The RFC 2617 defines the digest scheme 
as an extension for HTTP/1.1. It is a security enhancement alternative that avoids the most serious 
flaws of basic HTTP authentication. However, digest does not provide any security of the content 
and represents multiple security risks.  
 
Currently with the wide adoption of dynamic web programming, HTTP authentication is rarely 
used in real-world scenarios [5]. In fact instead of relying on server mechanisms, web 
applications have become capable of directly validating user’s authentication information. For 
instance, relying on integrated browser dialog boxes do not integrate well with web 2.0 
applications that desire to attract the maximum number of users. Therefore, using a HTML form 
with input fields that allows users to enter their username and password has become the dominant 
authentication option due to its rich user experience and flexibility [6]. After the user submits the 
form it is passed through a HTTP method (Get or POST) to the web application. If the credentials 
are correct, then the user is authenticated.  
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The lack of a standard form-based authentication and the limited security background of 
webmasters, has created a set of unique design and implementation choices, which contain 
various authentication flaws [5], [6], [4]. It is known that passwords often offer poor security and 
there are numerous publications that have studied these in-depth passwords issues [5], [7], [8]. 
These problems have led to us to view  password-based systems as weak authentication systems, 
hated by users and have reached their limits [9]–[11]. Security experts recognize that we need a 
replacement scheme. The National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC) 
declared that “passwords are inconvenient and insecure [12]”. In the same direction, the European 
Central Bank (ECB) issued recommendations for internet payments that require the 
implementation of strong user authentication [13].   
 
While the security community has proposed a wide range of secure propositions, starting with the 
TLS client certificate [14] to hardware-based or phone-based multi-factor authentication [10], 
[15]–[18], Bonneau et al [19] demonstrated in a large study of 35 password replacement options 
that the majority  offer more security than passwords, but they are difficult to use and expensive 
to deploy. In other words, it is easy to provide security if you do not care about other factors. 
Furthermore, Grosse and Upadhay [20] mentioned that not all account types need more secure 
authentication mechanisms. We believe that trying to provide a single solution for authenticating 
all account types is the ultimate recipient of failure. Therefore, we suggest separating user 
accounts into three categories:   
 
1) Low-value: Security in this kind of account is not a concern. Webmasters and users are 
willing to adopt this easy and lightweight authentication.   
2) Medium-value: Security is important, but user experience and cost are the determining 
factors. Because of the market competition, players in this field are willing to use a cost-
effective and usable but less secure scheme, compared to a more secure but cost-per-user 
protocol that alters the user authentication behavior. 
3) High-value: Security is the priority, and user experience and performance are not 
determining factors. 
 
Passwords excel in the first category, but we believe that not all schemes can offer the same set of 
advantages [21]. For the high-value accounts, webmasters can mandate using hardware-based 
schemes which score very well in security benefits [19]. Webmasters and users of medium-value 
category suffer from the absence of a convenient and secure replacement of passwords. 
 
In this paper we propose a new mutual authentication scheme that preserves most 
username/password authentication advantages and simultaneously improves security using 
cryptography primitives. Even the most inexperienced user can authenticate without even noticing 
the background tasks handle by the browser. Compared with the previous propositions, our 
scheme not only offers webmasters with a clear framework within which to build secure a web 
user authentication scheme, but it also provides almost the same password user experience which 
does not require any additional hardware except a modern web browser. Our scheme offers 
another advantage which is that the user's identity and the associated public key are never stored 
nor transmitted as plain text. This enhances the security of the proposed protocol and protects the 
user's anonymity. Our proposed scheme is designed with browser vendors in mind. Native 
support in browsers will afford improvements in user experience, security and performance. Our 
security analysis shows that the proposed protocol fulfills the security benefits that a secure user 
authentication scheme should provide, and can resist various possible attacks.  The remainder of 
this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we summarize and discuss related authentication 
schemes to enhance web user authentication security and present their limits. In Section 3, we 
give background information on our proposition and identify properties required to provide 
webmasters and users with a secure and practical authentication. In Section 4, we propose a new 
user authentication scheme that we call StrongAuth and present its mutual authentication 
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protocol. In Section 5, we discuss the security analysis of the proposed protocol. We conclude the 
paper in Section 6.  
 
The notations used in this paper are listed in Table 1: 
 
Table 1: Notations 
 
Ui ith User 
IDi Unique identifier in the web application of user Ui 
Pi Text secret of user Ui 
Salti Cryptographic salt generated by the browser for each Pi 
d Web application domain name 
RWi Random value used at most once within the scope of a given session 
generated by the web application for user Ui 
RBi Random value used at most once within the scope of a given session 
generated by the browser for user Ui 
USKi Private key of user Ui generated by the browser 
UPKi Public key of user Ui generated by the browser 
SSK Web Server Private Key 
SPK Web Server Public Key 
encKey Encryption key generated from Pi  using a  key derivation function KDF 
E
 a (b)  Encryption of b by a 
Da (b) Decryption of b by a 
SigUSKi( ) Digital signature using the user’s Ui private key 
H( ) Cryptographic one way hash function. 
KDF() Secure key derivation function 
SSi Session key shared between Ui and the web application using HTTPS  
SK Fresh symmetric authentication tracking key 
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 
|| Concatenation 
⊕ XOR operation  
 
2. RELATED WORK 
 
In this section, we summarize and discuss related authentication methods used in practice or 
proposed in the literature to enhance password authentication on the web and present their limits.  
 
Strong password policy: One of the most deployed cost-efficient techniques to improve 
passwords security is mandating more difficult to guess passwords. While using this method may 
provide security against online guessing attacks (dictionary and brute force attacks), it cannot 
protect users against phishing and key-logging which are two of the major users of authentication 
attacks [22]. Furthermore, numerous accounts with strong passwords are hard to remember and 
some argue that from an economic viewpoint, users reject choosing hard to guess passwords [23].   
 
Two-Factor authentication:  NIST defines three main authentication factors: (1) something 
the user knows, such as a password or PIN (2) something the user has, such as a smart card or 
digital certificate (3) something the user is, for example, a fingerprint or other biometric 
information [24]. Two-factor authentication, or more generally multi-factor authentication, is a 
form of authentication that relies on at least two-factors. Traditionally, in addition to passwords, 
most proposed schemes add a smart card as the second factor [25]. Although hardware-based 
authentication could enhance the security of user authentication on the web, in return there is a 
big price to pay: 
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• Cost: even when users care about security, the majority of users may prefer to deal 
with password risks than buy an additional device.  
• Hardware device management: users can use password manager software or Single 
Sign On technology to manage multiple passwords. Nevertheless even with multiple 
hardware devices are used; they can be easily forgotten or lost. 
• User acceptability: users are resistant to innovation that alters their behavior [23], 
thus any complex or additional steps than the conventional username/password are 
hard to adopt. 
 
As a solution to the above limitations, a wide range of two-factor authentification  changed their 
focus to phone-based as a replacement for hardware dedicated devices [16]–[18]. The following 
three main assumptions can be made: 
 
• Cost-efficiency: almost everybody already owns a cell phone; there is no need to buy 
an additional device. 
• Usability: users are familiar with how to use a mobile phone. 
• Availability: phone is with the user at all times.  
 
While we agree with most of these assumptions, phone-based authentication raises 
several problems: 
 
• Security: mobile usability constraints can make phishing more common in mobile 
than in Desktop [26]. For instance, it is difficult to know the difference between 
HTTP and HTTPS URL in a mobile Web browser.  
• Phone-power: It is known that phone CPU and memory power has widely increased, 
but in general usage case performance is always less than a personal PC.  
 
SSL/TLS client authentication [14]: Both the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer 
Security (TLS) provide an optional mechanism to authenticate clients based on public key X509 
v3 certificate. Currently this method is the only secure standard for user authentication on the 
Web. Because of its implementation and administration costs, SSL/TLS client authentication is 
rarely used on the Web [27], [6]. Additionally, the authentication procedure is complex for non-
technical users. Other limitations are  discussed in [16], [28].    
 
 PhoneAuth [16]:  PhoneAuth takes a new approach of how to use public key cryptography for 
strong user authentication on the Web. While this scheme sheds insight on a new design 
possibility of public key cryptography for user authentication on the web and offers a secure 
alternative of password, we identified several issues related to the overall solution. As we’ve 
discussed, phone-based authentication creates several problems which make it difficult to replace 
passwords. One of the main issues with this solution is the reliance on connectivity mechanisms 
that may not be available in certain situations. For example, most personal computers nowadays 
do not have integrated Bluetooth connectivity. PhoneAuth operations modes present some 
limitations:  
 
• Opportunistic mode: Allows users with a legacy device that can't produce identity 
assertion or a device with no wireless connection adapter to use traditional password-
based login. Although this presents an important usability factor, it will open all the 
security holes of the traditional password login even if the user does not have a full 
privilege session. 
• Strict mode: Though we concede that this mode improves the overall security of 
authentication on the web, the requirement of the users phone within the proximity of the 
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browser during the first login will  create a dependency on a third party device that can be 
lost at any time.   
 
3. BACKGROUND AND GOALS 
 
In this section we will give background information about the ongoing advance of  browser-side 
cryptographic functionalities. Then we will identify properties required to provide webmasters 
and users with a mutual secure and practical authentication.  
 
3.1. Browser Cryptographic Functionalities 
 
Since the web browser is becoming the universal tool for interacting with remote servers, it is 
natural to ask whether existing browsers can perform cryptographic operations. This need come 
also with the expanding of Web 2.0 and cloud computing technologies. Thus, we briefly discuss 
some of in-browser current functionalities. 
 
Browsers cryptographic libraries: To support the HTTPS protocol, all modern browsers provide 
support to some cryptographic operations (e.g. generating the client random certificate and the 
verify message in the Handshake phase of SSL/TLS protocol [14]). For example, one of the most 
used cryptographic libraries is Network Security Services [29] which is a set of open source 
libraries designed to support cross-platform development of security-enabled applications. NSS 
implements major cryptographic algorithms, and supports smartcards and hardware cryptographic 
devices using the PKCS#11 module. 
 
JavaScript cryptography: In recent discussion of JavaScript cryptography, a controversial issue 
has been whether or not JavaScript should ever be used for cryptography. On the one hand, the 
author in [30] strongly argues that it is totally harmful to use JavaScript cryptography inside the 
browser. However, the authors in [31], [32] argue that claims such as JavaScript crypto isn’t a 
serious research area and is very bad for the advancement of security.  While we would agree 
with the objections against JavaScript cryptography in the context of web browsers as it stands 
today, we believe that it is possible to improve the language, and core libraries and researchers 
should work on this  in order to enhance the overall security of the web.   
 
CryptoAPI: W3C has created the Web Cryptography Working Group to develop a 
recommendation-track document that defines an API that lets developers implement secure 
application protocols on the level of Web applications, including message confidentiality and 
authentication services, by exposing trusted cryptographic primitives from the browser. In fact, as 
mentioned by the W3C the expected cryptography API recommendation will not be done until 
January 2015 [33]. The adoption of this standard by web browsers will improves the overall 
security of web applications. Until this is done, there are two non-standards implementations:  
 
• DOMCrypt [34]: Firefox extension that adds a new JavaScript object to any webpage. 
DOMCrypt's API is the initial straw man proposal for the W3C's Web Cryptography 
Working Group. 
• PolyCrypt [35]: JavaScript implementation funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security that people can use to get a feel for how they can use the CryptoAPI in practice 
 
Certificate and password managers: The five most popular browsers (Firefox, Chrome, Internet 
Explorer, Safari, and Opera) provide certificate management services. Using this built-in 
functionality, users can display information about the installed certificate including personal and 
authority certificates that the browser trusts, and    perform all the important certificate 
management actions (import, export, delete). In addition, browser-based password manager is one 
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of the most used techniques to solve passwords memorization problems. The first time the user 
enters his or her username and password, the browser demands user authorization to store the 
authentication credentials (username and password) in a special encrypted database. If the user 
accepts, each time the user visits the same web application, the browser will automatically auto-
fill the login form with the appropriate user credentials.  
 
3.2. Design Requirements 
 
Learning from previous proposition limitations and the ongoing advance in browser-side 
functionalities, we identify properties required to provide webmasters and users with a mutual 
secure and practical web user authentication. We then used these properties to design StrongAuth: 
 
1) Security: It will be built on a mechanism that solves password security weaknesses. Our 
goal is fulfilling the security requirements designed in [19]. In conjunction with SSL/TLS 
server authentication, the proposed protocol should provide mutual authentication 
between the user and the web application. User authentication credentials should be 
stored securely and even with a database compromise, StrongAuth should not leak any 
information. 
2) Usability: It will provide a similar user experience to the conventional password-based 
authentication. Even the most inexperienced user can authenticate without even noticing 
the background tasks handle by the browser. 
3) Adaptability: Users are resistant for innovation that alters their behavior [23]. Our 
proposed scheme will include in the registration phase an option that allows activation or 
deactivation, especially before the wide adoption of our proposed scheme.  
4) Deployability: Our proposed scheme will require minimal changes in the browser and the 
web application, and no additional hardware will be required.  
5) Cost-efficiency: Cost is always a factor that plays a decisive role in real-world scenario. 
Therefore our scheme will not involve superfluous cost per user, but instead be open-
source to implement and deploy by using existing technologies and standards. 
6) Browser support: Will be implemented as part of the browser (core component or 
extension) to provide adequate security and functionality guarantees.  
 
4. THE PROPOSED SCHEME 
 
In this section, we present our scheme based on the designed properties introduced in Section 3. 
First we give an overview of our scheme and then present its proposed protocol most important 
phases: registration phase, login and authentication phase as well as key renewal phase. 
 
4.1. Overall Design of StrongAuth 
 
As described in Figure 1, StrongAuth is a decentralized architecture. In fact, each web application 
manages its own users. This choice is based on the success of this decision in the case of 
passwords (each application stores passwords of its users), and the failure of the centralized X509 
certificates model (the dream of a global public key infrastructure never emerged because of 
several constraints, N. Ferguson and B. Schneier [36] gave comprehensible explanations about 
PKI issues). 
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Figure 1.  StrongAuth Proposed Design 
 
Our overall scheme is split into client a component side and a server component side. For each 
user, the client component includes: 
 
a. Web browser that support HTTPS.  
b. Client Cryptographic Services (CSS) implements the browser-side StrongAuth 
cryptographic operations like the: 
o Regeneration of pseudo-random sequences; 
o Creation of asymmetric key pair; 
o Generation of symmetric key using a key derivation function; 
o Encryption of keys; 
o Creation and validation of digital signature; 
c. User Authentication Credentials Manager (UACM) is the core of our proposition. Similar 
to modern browsers certificate and password  managers the UACM is responsible for: 
o Storing user’s credentials in the credential store. 
o Importing and exporting user’s credentials. 
d. Credentials Store (CS) is typically a persistent storage database. The basic format of a 
record is shown in Table 2. It includes four fields, but can be further extended if 
necessary:  
o Identification represents the primary key of the table. For each Ui a unique ID 
exists in a specific web application. To protect the user identity IDi 
confidentiality, the browser store IDi hash value concatenated with d. In case of 
CS compromise the attacker will only get the hash value: H(IDi|| d). 
o Private key is the user Ui encrypted private key using encKey which is generated 
from Pi and Salti using a secure key derivation function and a NIST-approved 
symmetric algorithm: EencKey(USKi) 
o Salt is a large and sufficiently pseudo-random salt generated by the web 
application. It is used to calculate the encryption key encKey for encrypting the 
USKi.  
o Public key contains the encrypted format of the user Ui public key using: 
EencKey(UPKi).  
 
Table 2: The basic format of a user authentication credential 
 
Identification Private key Salt Public key … 
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The server component contains the following: 
 
• Server Cryptographic Services (SCS) works as the web application engine for the 
registration, authentication and key renewal cryptographic operations. 
• Registration Database (RD) stores after a successful registration the user information 
that will be used in the authentication and key renewal phases. It contains three field and 
can be further extended: 
o Identification stores the user identity IDi as Bi = H (IDi||d) to recognize a specific 
user Ui and simultaneously protect its confidentiality. 
o Public Key contains the user Ui public key UPKi, which is stored as Ci = (UPKi 
⊕
 SSK ⊕ RWi) to preserve its secrecy.  
o Random is stored as SRi= RWi ⊕ H(SSK) and used to retrieve the UPKi 
 
The process of our scheme includes three phases: registration phase, login and authentication 
phase and the key renewal phase. The steps of our proposed protocol are depicted in Figure 2. 
 
User Ui Browser  Web Application 
Registration Phase 
Chooses IDi  
and  Pi 
 
Generates UPKi , USKi, Salti 
Computes 
encKey=KDF(Pi,Salti), 
A1i =  EencKey(USKi), 
A2i =  EencKey(UPKi) 
Stores H(IDi||d) , A1i, A2i, Salti 
 
 
 
IDi  , UPKi 
(HTTPS) 
 
 
 
 
Generates RWi 
Computes  Bi = H (IDi||d) ,  
SRi= RWi ⊕ H(SSK),  
Ci = UPKi⊕ SSK⊕ RWi 
 Stores Bi, SRi, Ci 
Login and Authentication Phase 
 Generates SSi 
Computes Ki = ESPK(SSi) 
 
 
Ki 
(HTTPS) 
 
 
Decrypt Ki with SSK  
Enters   IDi 
and  Pi 
 
Generates RBi 
Computes H(IDi||d),  
encKey=KDF(Pi, Salti), 
USKi =  DencKey(A1i), 
UPKi =  DencKey(A2i), 
Di = IDi ⊕ H(SSi), 
 Fi =  RBi ⊕ SSi⊕ UPKi 
Ei = SigUSKi(H(IDi ||d|| UPKi || 
RBi ||SSi)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Di, Fi, Ei 
(HTTP)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Computes  IDi’ = Di ⊕  H(SSi), 
 Bi’= H (IDi’||d) 
Verifies if Bi = Bi’ 
On success  
Computes   RWi = SRi ⊕ H(SSK), 
UPKi = Ci  ⊕ SSK⊕  RWi, 
RBi =  Fi ⊕  SSi ⊕  UPKi 
Ei’ = (DUPKi(Ei)),  
Ei’’= H(IDi’|| UPKi || d || RBi ||SSi) 
Verifies if  Ei’ =  Ei’’ 
  
 
 
 
Computes  
RWi = Gi ⊕  SSi⊕ UPKi , 
Mi’= H (RBi || RWi ||SSi|| UPKi) 
 
 
 
Gi, Mi 
(HTTP) 
On success  
Generates RWi 
Computes Gi = RWi ⊕  SSi ⊕ UPKi, 
Mi = H (RBi || RWi ||SSi|| UPKi), 
SK= H(IDi ||d || UPKi||RBi || RWi || SSi) 
 
International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA) Vol.6, No.6, November 2014 
9 
Verifies if Mi = Mi’ 
 
On success  
SK= H(IDi ||d || UPKi||RBi || 
RWi || SSi) 
 
Key renewal phase 
chooses Pinew  
Generates UPKinew, USKinew, 
Saltinew 
Computes 
encKeynew=KDF(Pinew, Saltinew), 
Xi = SK ⊕ UPKi ⊕ UPKinew   
Yi = H(SK|| UPKi|| UPKinew) 
 
 
Updates A1inew, A2inew, Saltinew 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Xi , Yi 
(HTTP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Computes  
UPKinew =  Xi ⊕  SK ⊕  UPKi , 
Y’i = H(SK|| UPKi|| UPKinew) 
Verifies if  Y’I = Yi 
On success  
Generates RWinew 
Updates  Ci = UPKinew⊕SSK⊕ RWinew, 
SRi new =  RWinew ⊕ H(SSK) 
 
Figure 1.  StrongAuth proposed Protocol 
 
4.2. Registration Phase 
 
A new user has to register to the web application to become a legal client. The protocol at first 
uses HTTPS to provide server authentication using public key certificate and to protect the 
confidentiality and integrity of the user’s identity IDi and the associated public key UPKi. 
 
1) Similar to traditional password authentication mechanism, the user Ui chooses a user 
identifier IDi and a text secret Pi. If the user chooses to activate StrongAuth, the browser 
executes  the following background actions: 
a. Generates an asymmetric key pair UPKi, USKi and Salti 
b. Sends the user IDi and the associated public key UPKi over a secure HTTPS 
session to the web application. 
c. Computes the symmetric encryption key encKey from the user Ui secret Pi and 
Salti using a secure key derivation functions encKey=KDF(Pi, Salti). To improve 
the security and usability of Pi, we could give Ui the possibility to generate a 
strong text secret from a digital personal object [37]. 
d. Computes A1i = EencKey(USKi) , A2i =  EencKey(UPKi), and stores in its database the 
user authentication credentials : H(IDi||d) , A1i, A2i, Salti. 
2. The web application generates random value RWi. Next, it calculates and stores in its 
database Bi as Bi = H (IDi||d) , Ci as  Ci = UPKi ⊕ SSK⊕ RWi and SRi as  SRi= RWi ⊕ 
H(SSK). 
 
4.3. Authentication and Login Phase 
 
When the user Ui wants to login to a web application that implements StrongAuth, his/her 
browser establishes a secure session with the web server using the HTTPS protocol and requests 
the authentication service. HTTPS is required to provide server authentication using public key 
certificate (strong server-side authentication) and to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the 
session key SSi.  
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1) After the validation of the server authentication certificate, the browser generates a new 
SSL/TLS session key SSi, encrypts its using the server public key SPK as Ki = ESPK(SSi) 
and sends it to the web application. 
2) The server decrypts Ki with its private key SSK. After that, all the subsequent messages 
of this phase are exchanged without using the HTTPS protocol.  
3) The user Ui enters his/her identity IDi and Pi to the browser.  
4) The browser computes H(IDi||d) and retrieves from the CS the matching user credentials 
(A1i, A2i, Salti) in case of a correct IDi. If not, the operation is aborted with an error 
message.  
5) The browser generates RBi and computes encKey=KDF(Pi, Salti), USKi =  DencKey(A1i), 
UPKi =  DencKey(A2i), Di = IDi ⊕ H(SSi) ,Fi =  RBi ⊕ SSi⊕ UPKi and a digital signature 
using the user USKi
 
as Ei = SigUSKi(H(IDi ||d|| UPKi || RBi ||SSi)). Then, the browser sends 
Di, Fi  ,Ei to the web application.  
6) To identify the user Ui , the web application computes IDi’ from Di as IDi’ = Di ⊕ H(SSi) 
and  Bi’= H (IDi’||d). If Bi’ exists in the registration database, the web application 
recognize the user Ui and retrieves form its database the corresponding RWi as RWi = SRi 
⊕ H(SSK) and UPKi as UPKi = Ci  ⊕ SSK⊕ RWi. If not, the request is rejected. 
Afterwards, the web applications calculates RBi as RBi =  Fi ⊕ SSi⊕ UPKi , Ei’ = 
(DUPKi(Ei)), Ei’’= H(IDi’|| UPKi || d || RBi ||SSi). If both Ei’’ and Ei’ values are equal, the 
user Ui is successfully authenticated and proceeds to the next steps. Otherwise, the login 
request from the user Ui is rejected. 
7) The web application generates RWi, and calculates Gi = RWi ⊕ SSi⊕ UPKi  and Mi = H 
(RBi || RWi ||SSi|| UPKi), and sends Gi and Mi to Ui browser. 
8) The browser calculates RWi = Gi ⊕ SSi⊕ UPKi, because it knows the public key UPKi   of 
user Ui. After that, the browser computes Mi’ as Mi’= H (RBi || RWi ||SSi|| UPKi), and 
verifies if Mi value equal Mi’. If both values are equal the Ui browser is assured that the 
messages are sent by the legal web application. Therefore, the mutual authentication 
between the browser and the web application is successfully accomplished.   
9) After successful mutual authentication, both the browser and the web application 
computes a fresh symmetric key SK= H(IDi ||d || UPKi||RBi || RWi || SSi), which will then 
serve as the basis for authentication tracking. 
 
4.4. Key Renewal Phase 
 
In password-based authentication, it is recommended to change the password regularly. Similarly, 
cryptographic keys should have a definite lifetime. In our protocol, the process from the user Ui 
perspective is similar to changing his/her password. Ui browser’s takes charge of the additional 
steps. 
 
1. The user Ui authenticates to the web application. 
2. After successful mutual authentication between the user Ui and the web application, Ui 
chooses a new Pinew.  
3. The browser generates new user credentials UPKinew, USKinew, Saltinew, A1inew,  Saltinew and 
sends to the web application Xi = SK⊕ UPKi ⊕ UPKinew  and Yi = H(SK|| UPKi|| UPKinew). 
After that, the browser computes and updates its database: A1i =  EencKey(USKinew), A2i =  
EencKey(UPKinew) , Saltinew. 
4. The web applications computes UPKinew from Xi as UPKinew = Xi ⊕ SK⊕ UPKi and verifies 
if Y’i = H(SK|| UPKi|| UPKinew) value equals the received Yi value. If both values are 
equal, the web application is assured that the request is sent by the legitimate user Ui and 
the message is not tampered during transmission. As a result, the web application 
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generate a RWinew and updates Ci = UPKinew ⊕ SSK⊕ RWinew, SRi new =  RWinew ⊕ H(SSK). 
Otherwise, the request is rejected.  
 
4.5. Particular Issues 
 
Without the stored user credentials, a specific user Ui cannot authenticate to his/her web account. 
In our actual proposition scheme, the authentication information used in the registration phase is 
stored locally in the user’s machine which creates a portability issue. Furthermore, users could 
lose the authentication credentials by formatting their machine or replacing them with newer 
modes. Thus, a recovery mechanism is needed. These issues are complicated and have non-trivial 
tensions between availability, security, usability, accessibility, and privacy. We are working on 
the possibility of using cloud computing technology, but we are in the beginning stages of 
building a system that attempts to navigate these various constraints. 
Inspiring from a modern browser certificate manager, we propose an importation/exportation 
mechanism that allows users to backup their authentication information on personal devices that 
users consistently carry with them (e.g. USB flash memory). 
 
5. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
 
In this section, security analysis of the proposed protocol is given. We will prove that the 
proposed protocol fulfills the eleven security benefits that a secure web user authentication 
scheme on the web should provide [19], and show that the proposed protocol can resist other 
possible attacks.  
 
B1:  Resilient-to-Physical-Observation. 
B2: Resilient-to-Targeted-Impersonation. 
B3:  Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing. 
B4:  Resilient-to-Unthrottled-Guessing. 
B5:  Resilient-to-Internal-Observation. 
B6:  Resilient-to-Leaks-from-Other-Verifiers. 
B7:  Resilient-to-Phishing.  
B8:  Resilient-to-Theft.  
B9:  No-Trusted-Third-Party 
B10:  Requiring-Explicit-Consent. 
B11:  Un-linkable. 
 
5.1. Security Benefits 
 
Our scheme is very different compared to others. The user identity IDi and the associated public 
key UPKi both can be considered as a secret parameter of the user because they are never 
transmitted nor stored as plain text in our scheme. The security of our scheme is not depended on 
this assumption.  
 
In the proposed protocol, to authenticate the attacker has to generate Di = IDi ⊕ H(SSi), Fi =  RBi 
⊕ SSi⊕ UPKi,  Ei  = SigUSKi(H(IDi ||d||UPKi|| RBi ||SSi), which are completely different with each 
new user authentication. For instance, the digital signature varies constantly and a new SSi and 
RBi values are regenerated for each new HTTPS session. In addition both Pi and USKi are never 
transmitted over the network. Thus, our scheme meets B1, B2, B3, and B4.  
 
Our proposed protocol fulfills B5 and B8, because we assume that the attacker cannot steals both 
the Ui private key and the associated Pi. In addition, the user IDi and UPKi are never stored nor 
transmitted in a plain text, and the private key USKi and UPKi are stored in an encrypted format 
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using a strong NIST approved symmetric algorithm. For more critical application, the private key 
can be moved out of reach of thieving malware on the user Ui   devices, using a hardware Trusted 
Platform Module (TPM) [38].  It also meets B6 because even if the attacker steal the verification 
table by breaking into the web application’s registration database, the attacker does not have 
sufficient information to calculate Bi = H (IDi||d) , SRi= RWi ⊕ H(SSK), Ci = UPKi ⊕ SSK⊕ RWi , 
the user's USKi , IDi and Pi.  In addition, our proposition is secure against phishing attack (B7) 
since the falsified web application cannot produce valid credentials (Gi = RWi ⊕  SSi ⊕  UPKi, Mi = 
H (RBi || RWi ||SSi|| UPKi)). 
 
Our proposed protocol requires a trusted-third-party for the server SSL/TLS certificate 
authentication, which mean that in case of a server certificate authority compromise the attacker 
can get the session key value SSi and IDi from Di as IDi = Di ⊕ H(SSi), but cannot compute a valid  
Fi =  RBi ⊕ SSi ⊕ UPKi, Ei = SigUSKi(H(IDi ||d|| UPKi || RBi ||SSi)) because it does not know the 
user’s Ui   private/public key (USKi , USKi), the user IDi nor the associated user Pi.  
Our proposed protocol cannot be started without the user Ui submitting to his/her browser the 
associated secret text Pi to decrypt the corresponding private key USKi, and UPKi which offers 
B10. The decentralize characteristic of our scheme, and the dynamic identity used in each session 
Di = IDi ⊕ H(SSi) protects the user privacy and makes it unlinkable (B11). 
 
5.2. Other Attacks 
 
Eavesdropper: In this type of attack the adversary can see all the network traffic between the 
user Ui   and the web application, but cannot modify any message. Thus the attacker can reply 
authenticators. The user Ui   never sends his/her private key and text secret Pi over the network. In 
addition the browser uses pseudo-random nonce RBi value and SSi session key to generate 
dynamic identity and a different signature for each new HTTPS session. Hence our protocol can 
withstand this attack. 
 
Message modification or insertion attack: Message modification and insertion attack gives an 
attacker the possibility to alter and add some specific information with the attention to gain 
unauthorized access to the user Ui   account. The attacker can alter SSi, Di = IDi ⊕ H(SSi), Fi =  RBi 
⊕ SSi ⊕ UPKi,,  and Gi = RWi ⊕ SSi ⊕ UPKi,, however with the usage of secure digital public key 
signature and collision free cryptographic hash function our solution is secure against these  type 
of attacks. 
 
SSL/TLS Man-in-the-middle attack: It is known that the security of HTTPS depends on correct 
certificate server authentication signed by a trust certification authority. Unfortunately with 
current browsers PKI trust-model, hundreds of certification authorities are installed and trusted 
from more than 50 different countries which results in several reported attacks against this 
authorities [39]. In this specific attack the attacker has a forged SSL/TLS certificate for the server 
to which the user Ui is authenticating, thus allowing him to perform SSL/TLS man-in-the-middle 
attacks. The attacker in this case can fake the user Ui  to send the chosen session key SSi encrypted 
with the attacker public key. We assume a secure HTTPS server authentication in the registration 
phase, hence the attacker cannot impersonate the user’s Ui  since he does not possess the Ui 
associated private key USKi  or the symmetric encryption key encKey. Even with the knowledge 
of SSi, the adversary cannot computes Ei’ = DUPKi(Ei), Ei’’= H (IDi ||d ||UPKi ||RBi || SSi), Gi = 
RWi ⊕ SSi ⊕ UPKi, Mi = H (RBi || RWi ||SSi|| UPKi). Therefore our proposed protocol can 
withstand SSL/TLS Man-in-the-middle attack. 
 
Off-line dictionary and brute force attack: To launch off-line brute force attack, an attacker 
first steals the user credentials authentication from the user credentials store: Ai =  EencKey(USKi), 
A2i =  EencKey(UPKi) and the hash value of the user identity IDi. Even after having an Ai , A2i the 
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attacker has to decrypt both the private and public keys which is not possible without the 
knowledge of the symmetric encryption key encKey since we assume the usage of secure key 
derivation function with at least 64 bits salt Salti long and a minimum of 1000 iteration counts 
[40]. Also the attacker needs to know the user IDi, which is stored in a hash value using a 
cryptographic one way hash function. Therefore our protocol is secure against off-line brute force 
attacks. For additional security we could leverage a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). The user 
authentication information would reside in the TPM’s trusted storage facility, but this is not 
required in our scheme.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we proposed a new mutual authentication scheme that preserves most 
username/password actual authentication advantages and simultaneously improves security using 
cryptographic primitives. Indeed, even the most inexperienced user can authenticate without even 
noticing the background tasks handle by the browser. Compared with the previous propositions, 
our scheme not only offers webmasters a clear framework within which to build secure web user 
authentication scheme, but also provides almost the same traditional user experience which does 
not require any additional hardware. Our scheme has another advantage that the user's identity 
and the associated public key are never stored nor transmitted as a plain text which enhances the 
security of the proposed protocol and protects the user's anonymity. Our proposed protocol is 
designed with adoption by browser vendors in mind. Native support in browsers will afford 
improvements in user experience, security and performance. Security analysis showed that the 
proposed protocol fulfils the security benefits that a secure user authentication scheme should 
provide and can resist to various possible attacks such as SSL/TLS man-in-the-middle attack, off-
line dictionary and brute force attack, and message modification or insertion attack. Future scope 
in this work is to investigate the possibility of using cloud computing technology to improve the 
portability and recovery of our scheme. We also plan to provide a secure design for user’s session 
management. While the proposed scheme needs public key cryptography, then we will further 
focus on elliptic curve cryptography which offers faster computations and less power use. 
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